Duquesne Law Review
Volume 38
Number 3 The Pennsylvania Issue

Article 5

2000

Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Constitutional Law
Jennifer R. Minter

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer R. Minter, Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Constitutional Law, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 807 (2000).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol38/iss3/5

This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Recent Developments in
Pennsylvania Constitutional Law
Jennifer R. Minter*
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

-

PROCEDURAL

DUE

PROCESS

-

The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who seeks
monetary damages under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act is
not entitled to a jury trial.

Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999).
In 1990 Sherry Wertz, who worked as a road crew laborer for
Chapman Township, informed her supervisor, Fred Gummo, that
she would no longer be able to lift more than twenty-five pounds
because she was pregnant.' According to Wertz, her employer
began to sexually harass her, and rather than allowing her to avoid
lifting heavy objects, ordered her to do so. 2 After complaining to
the Chapman Township Supervisors about the alleged conduct, who
subsequently ordered Gummo to stop the behavior, Wertz claimed
that the harassment only intensified. 3 Wertz was terminated from
4
her job as a road crew laborer on May 11, 1990.

Wertz' initial claims alleging violations under federal and state
employment discrimination laws were dismissed in federal court as
time-barred, causing her state claims to be transferred to the
Clinton County Court of Common Pleas. 5 After denying Wertz'
motion for a jury trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of Chapman
Township, finding no violations under the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act ("PHRA7). 6 The commonwealth court affirmed the
* Executive Comment Editor, Volume 38, Duquesne Law Review; J.D. 2000, Duquesne
University School of Law; B.A. 1997, Dickinson College.
1. Wertz v. Chapman Township, 741 k2d 1272, 1273 (Pa. 1999). The township hired
Wertz to replace her mother, who had left due to medical reasons. Id.
2. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1273. Specifically, Wertz alleged that her supervisor, Fred
Gummo, made sexually degrading remarks about Wertz, threatened to fire her, isolated her
from other workers, and made unjustified complaints about her work habits. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Specifically, Wertz' brought suit in state court alleging violations under the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA7). Id.
6. Court of Common Pleas, Clinton County, No. 793-94. Richard M. Saxton, President
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trial court's denial of a jury trial, but found that the trial court had
erred in excluding certain trial testimony and ordered a new trial.7
Wertz filed a petition to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for
allowance of appeal, and the supreme court granted allocatur to
8
decide the issue of whether Wertz was entitled to a jury trial.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by
determining whether the language of the PHRA entitled Wertz to a
jury trial, which the court held it did not.9 In reaching that decision,
the court noted that the statute itself was silent as to the subject of
a jury trial, leading it to presume that if the General Assembly had
wanted to grant a right to a jury trial, such language would have
been expressly included in the statute. 10 Additionally, the court
looked at the use of the word "court" in the statute, and indicated
that this was strong evidence that a tribunal should be used to
make findings under the statute, rather than a jury.' Finally, the
court observed that no legislative history existed that would
indicate that a right to a jury trial had been intended. 2
Another argument made by the appellant was that the language
of the statute provided for "legal" relief, which translated into a
right to a jury trial, especially because this case involved monetary
damages.'3 In response to this argument, the court opined that the
use of such language in the statute did not necessarily reflect
4
legislative intent to provide for a jury trial under the PHRA.'
Next, the court determined whether Wertz had a right to a jury
Judge, issued the holding. Id.
7. See Wertz v. Chapman Township, 709 A.2d 428, 438 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997). Judge
James J. Flaherty issued the opinion. Id.
8. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1273. At the supreme court, attorney Jeffrey C. Dohrmanm from
Williamsport represented Sherry Wertz, and attorney Anthony R. Sherr from Blue Bell
represented Chapman Township. Id.
9. Id. at 1274. Justice Ralph J. Cappy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief
Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Russell M. Nigro, Sandra Schultz Newman, and
Thomas G. Saylor. Justice Stephen A. Zappala concurred in the result. Id. at 1273. Justice
Ronald D. Castille dissented. Id. at 1280-81 (Castille, J., dissenting). The court looked at the
following language of the PHRA in making its determination: If the court finds the
respondent has engaged in such discriminatory practices charged in the complaint, the court
shall enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful discriminatory practice and order
affirmative action which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of
employees, granting of back pay, or any other legal or equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate. Id.at 1274 (quoting PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(c)(3) (West 1994)).
10.

Id.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 1274-75.
13. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1275.
14. Id.
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trial under the Pennsylvania
accordance with applicable
right to a jury trial only
particular cause of action at
Constitution was adopted. 16

Constitution. 1 The court stated that, in
case law, the constitution preserved a
where such a right existed for the
issue at the time that the Pennsylvania
The court opined that jury trials were

not required for discrimination cases at the time of the adoption of
the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that a cause of action for sexual
harassment or discrimination did not even exist at that time;
therefore the appellant did not have the right to a jury trial under

the constitution.17
Wertz then argued to the court that federal case law suggested
that she be entitled to a jury trial, by submitting that federal
district courts in Pennsylvania have predicted that state courts

would find a right to a jury trial existed under the PHRA.18 In
looking at this issue, the court pointed out that the federal cases
cited by the appellant interpreted the United States Constitution,
and that a state court is not bound to apply any federal court's

interpretation of the United States Constitution to a provision of
the state constitution, even if the two provisions are practically
identical. 19 Additionally, the court rejected the suggestion that it
analyze this case in a manner similar to the examination under
federal case law of the right to a jury trial under the United States
Constitution, because the federal cases have a different focus than
what Pennsylvania case law has historically focused on regarding
20
the right to a jury trial.
15. Id. at 1275. Article 1, Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states: "Trial by
jury shall be as heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate." PA. CONST. art. I, § 6.
16. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1275-76. To support this contention, the court cited to three
cases; Byers and Davis v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862); Appeal of Watson, 105 A.2d 576
(Pa. 1954); William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 173 A-2d 64 (Pa. 1961). Id. at 1276. The
court also looked at the following three-prong test to aid in their determination: (1) was
there a statutory requirement for a jury trial in the case; (2) were jury trials required in the
type of proceeding at issue when the constitution was adopted; and (3) if jury trials were
required, was there a common law basis for the proceedings. Id. (citing Commonwealth v.
One (1) 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe, 610 A.2d 36 (1992)). Because the court had already
determined that no statutory requirement existed, it turned to the second prong of the test.
Id. at 1277.
17. Id. at 1277. The third prong of the test was dependent on satisfaction of the second
prong, so the court did not consider the third prong in its analysis. Id.
18. Id. (citing Lubin v. American Packaging Corp., 760 F. Supp. 450 (E.D. Pa. 1991);
Galeone v. American Packaging Corp., 764 F Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1991)). In making this
statement, appellant conceded that the cases largely relied upon federal interpretation of the
right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.
19. Id. at 1278 (citing Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 626 A.2d 537 (Pa. 1993)).
20. Id. The court noted that it has
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Finally, the appellant attempted to analogize that sexual
discrimination was essentially the same as the tort of personal
injury or wrongful discharge, which were recognizable at common
law and had a common law basis.21 Again, the court rejected this
argument, reiterating their test as to whether a right to a jury trial
existed under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and stating that any
sort of "analogy" argument would be contrary to prior case law
22
from which the test was forged.
Justice Ronald D. Castille dissented from the majority opinion
affirming the order of the commonwealth court.23 In his dissent,
Justice Castille begins by stating that the right to a jury trial is
central to the system of justice, and the fact that the PHRA
remained silent on the issue should not impinge on this central
right. 24 Justice Castille also disagreed with the majority's view
regarding interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution; he
believed that the majority employed a strict construction, when
what the framers intended to create with the constitution was a
document that could adapt and evolve with the changing needs of
society, a document that would grant Wertz the right to a jury trial
25
in her employment discrimination case.
However, the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Pennsylvania Constitution did not automatically grant the
right to a jury trial, unless it meets the test of historical longevity
created by the court. The Wertz decision, that an employee was not
entitled to a jury trial for claims arising under the PHRA, was a
historically viewed the proper analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution to consist
of, inter alia, an inquiry into whether a jury trial existed for the cause of action at
common law at the time of the adoption of our Constitution. Conversely, federal case
law examines whether the statutory cause of action is analogous to a common law
claim for which there was a right to trial by jury, with focus . . . on the relief
provided.
Id. at 1278.
21. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1278.
22. Id. at 1279.
23. Id. at 1280 (Castille, J., dissenting).
24. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). To support this contention, Justice Castille points out
that certain statutory provisions, such as those dealing with negligence and defamation, do
not address the right to a jury trial, but jury trials are nonetheless provided. Id. (Castilie, J.,
dissenting). He also distinguishes the case relied on by the majority in reaching a conclusion
on this issue. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting) (citing Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998)).
25. Wertz, 741 A.2d at 1280-81 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille, in supporting
his interpretation of the constitution stated, "An interpretation . . . too rigid to encompass
societal changes makes a mockery of the . . . Commonwealth. Thus, I would hold that the
Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees appellant the right to a trial by jury in this... action."
Id. at 1281 (Castille, J., dissenting).
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matter of first impression in Pennsylvania. Additionally, the court
established a clear test to use to determine whether a particular
cause of action should receive a jury trial in accordance with the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

-

SEARCHES OF HIGH

SCHOOL STUDENTS - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a
knife seized from a high school student, during a search of all
students for weapons as a precondition of entry, was the product
of a lawful search under both the United States Constitution and
the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In the Interest of FB., 726 A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999) cert. denied, 120 S.
Ct. 613 (Dec. 13, 1999).
This case involves the constitutionality of a "point of entry"
search of a Philadelphia high school, during which a student was
arrested for bringing a weapon, a three inch Swiss army knife, onto
school property. 6 A "point of entry" search involves students
standing in a line outside school who are required to empty their
pockets, coats, bookbags, etc., which are searched, and the
students themselves are scanned with a hand-held metal detector
27
before being allowed to enter the school building.
The arrested student ("F.B."), being a juvenile, first had a hearing
in juvenile court, where he attempted to suppress the knife, arguing
that it had been found using a search for which there had been no
individualized reasonable suspicion to believe that F.B. had violated
any school policy or regulations. 28 The trial court rejected this
argument, stating that the "point of entry" search was a justified
and reasonable response to the increased violence occurring at the
school.2 9 The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court
decision, 30 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted FB.'s
26. In the Interest of FB., 726 A.2d 361, 363 (Pa. 1999) cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 613
(Dec. 13, 1999).
27. In re PB., 726 A.2d at 363. These searches are conducted by members of the
Philadelphia Police Department, under the direction of the Philadelphia Public School
system. Id. A student manual described the search procedures and policies employed in this
case, and students and parents received notification before the start of the school year that
those entering the building will be subjected to periodic searches. Id. Additionally, notices
regarding the search procedures are posted throughout the school, and such notices are
mailed to students' homes on a regular basis. Id.
28. Id. at 364.
29. Id. The ruling was made by Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court Judge
Sheldon C. Jelin. Id. at 362.
30. In the Interest of EB., 658 A.2d 1378 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1994). Judge Justin M. Johnson
wrote the opinion for the superior court. Id. at 1379.
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Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 31
FB. challenged the constitutionality of the search under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as
Article One, Section Eight of the Pennsylvania Constitution.3 2 The
court began its analysis by citing to an earlier Pennsylvania
Supreme Court case, Commonwealth v. Cass,, which held that a
general search held within a school did not violate the Fourth
Amendment so long as the search meets a reasonableness test, set
forth in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.Y The court in Cass
was unable to agree on a definite test for school searches under
the Pennsylvania Constitution, but there were some factors that the
Cass majority did agree on, which were employed by the LB. court
as a starting point.35 Before beginning the analysis, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that state policy regarding
personal privacy created a higher standard of scrutiny under the
state constitution; thus, if the school search was found
constitutional under the state constitution, then it would also pass
36
a Fourth Amendment test.
The first "factor" considered by the court was an inquiry into the
level of personal privacy that a public school student could expect
while in the school setting, which the court found to be limited.37
31. In re FB., 726 A.2d at 364. At the supreme court, attorneys John W. Packel and
Jeffrey P. Shender from the Philadelphia County Public Defenders Office represented FB.,
and attorneys Catherine Marshall and Thomas W. Dolgenos from the City of Philadelphia
District Attorney's Office represented the Commonwealth. Id. at 363.
Justice Ralph J. Cappy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Ronald D. Castille
and Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. Chief Justice John P Flaherty, Jr., filed a concurring
opinion, and Justice Russell M. Nigro concurred in the result. Id. at 368. (Flaherty, C.J.,
concurring). Justice Stephen A. Zappala filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 369-73 (Zappala, J.,
dissenting).
32. Id. at 364.
33. 709 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1998) (plurality opinion).
34. 515 U.S. 646 (1995); see also Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A.2d 350 (1998). The three
factors to be considered in the reasonableness test are:
1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search at issue intrudes, 2) the
character of the intrusion, and 3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern and the efficacy of the means utilized to address that concern.
In the Interest of FB., 726 A.2d at 364 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 654).
35. In re RB., 726 A.2d at 364-65. The factors were identified by the court as the
following:
1) a consideration of the students' privacy interest, 2) the nature of the intrusion
created by the search, 3) notice, and 4) the overall purpose to be achieved by the
search and the immediate reasons prompting the decision to conduct the actual
search.
Id. at 365.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). The court quoted from Cass,

2000

Pennsylvania Constitutional Law

813

Although it acknowledged that the privacy interest in belongings
actually on a student's person could be higher than the minimal
level of privacy that a student possesses in a school locker, the
court ultimately held that no greater privacy interest existed. 38 The
court analogized that because items such as coats, bookbags, and
purses could be searched if they were contained in a school locker,
they could be logically searched even if they were not in a school
locker, but rather on a student's actual person; thus no greater
39
privacy right existed.
. The second factor, the nature of the intrusion created by a
search, related closely to the first factor, and the court sought to
consider them in concert with each other.40 It was noted that the
use of a hand-held metal detector was no greater an intrusion than
that experienced by anyone traveling on an airplane who must pass
through a metal detector.41 The court acknowledged that this
involved a greater intrusion than a locker search; the non-invasive
character of the metal detector resulted in minimal intrusion to the
42
student.
In this case, the school district easily satisfied the third factor,
that of notice. 43 The school district set forth the parameters for the
search, as well as the actual method employed, in a manual, and
gave notice both in school and at students' homes.44 The final
factor, the overall purpose to be achieved by the search and the
immediate reasons prompting the decision for the search, appeared
to be the weakest link for the school district.45 Although the school
"[tihe need to protect all students, to ensure school discipline, and protect school property,
limits the student's expectation of privacy while in the school environment.: Id. (quoting
Cass, 709 A.2d at 360).
38. Id. The court, using the Cass decision as a guideline, accepted that a search of
school lockers could extend to a search of personal items within a locker, including
bookbags, coats, and purses. Id.
39. Id.
40. In the Interest of FB., 726 A.2d at 365.
41. Id. at 366.
42. Id. The court went on to note that, while a walk through a metal detector would be
less intrusive to students, a search will not be barred merely because a less intrusive method
exists; rather one must consider whether the means employed "are not so expansive as to be
disproportionate to the purpose of the search." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court stated that the notice given in this case provides an additional
safeguard, in that the forewarning would serve to discourage students from bringing
weapons into the school, which was the ultimate goal of the search, to keep weapons and
violence out of the public school system. Id.
45. In re EB., 726 A.2d at 366. In this case, there were no records produced to provide
reasoning as to why school staff believed the point of entry searches were necessary,
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district could produce no records to support their decision to
conduct "point of entry" searches, especially on the particular day
at issue, the court opined that the interest in keeping weapons and
violence out of schools was so obvious that the requirement of
46
records to support the decision to search was needless.
Additionally, the increased rate of violence within the Philadelphia
school district, of which the trial court gave judicial notice, gave
credence to the decision to conduct a search on the particular day
at issue.47 Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
search of F.B. at his school on the particular day at issue met the
minimum constitutional requirements under both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article
One, Section Eight, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 48
Chief Justice John P Flaherty, Jr., who joined in the majority
opinion but wished to emphasize some points of .disagreement,
filed a concurring opinion.49 First, Chief Justice Flaherty disagreed
with the majority's view that the intrusion was minimal, but
believed that the unique quality of the school environment caused
the search to be constitutional nonetheless. 50 Second, he disagreed
that the judicial notice of increased school violence justified the
particular search conducted, but since no one challenged the
justifications, they must be held sufficient. 51 Finally, Chief Justice
Flaherty wanted to note his concern with the classification of a
Swiss army knife as a "weapon," but again because there was no
challenge to this classification on appeal, the court could not reach
52
the issue.
Justice Stephen A. Zappala wrote a dissenting opinion, where he
opined that the search constituted "police conduct," which violated
especially on the particular day at issue. Id.
46. Id. at 366-67. The Philadelphia Public School Code's policy and procedure manual
discussing the applicable criteria for searches was then produced. Id. at 367.
47. Id. The court noted that, "the primary object of the search, to remove weapons
from students, comports with the duty and responsibility of the school administrators to
keep their charges safe while in the school environment." Id. (citing Cass, 709 A.2d at 365,
concurring opinion).
48. Id. at 368. The court pointed out that this holding of constitutionality as to the
search was limited to the sui generis school environment. Id.
49. Id. at 368-69 (Flaherty, C.J., concurring).
50. Id. (Flaherty, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Flaherty went on to add that the
search, while intrusive, was fairly related to the purposes for which the search was
completed. Id. (Flaherty, C.J., concurring).
51. In re EB., 726 A.2d at 368 (Flaherty, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. (Flaherty, C.J., concurring). He went on to add that, "if the items seized become
oppressive, the search itself may be regarded as an instrument of oppression and
unconstitutional regardless of its purpose." Id. at 369 (Flaherty, C.J., concurring).
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both the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions.5 Justice
Zappala disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Acton, and
stated his belief that the lesser degree of privacy afforded students
in a school environment does not apply in situations where the
police conduct the school search.5 Thus, if one employed the
heightened standard of probable cause, Justice Zappala believed
that the school violated F.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights because
probable cause for the search did not exist.5 Additionally, Justice
Zappala disagreed with the majority's analysis of the state
constitution, including their holding that the search constituted a
minimal physical intrusion, that the notice factor had been amply
satisfied, and their determination that the lack of records regarding
the decision to search was outweighed by the need to keep
weapons out of schools. 56 Thus, Justice Zappala found that the
search of F.B. resulted in a violation of the Pennsylvania
57
constitution.
.The significance of this case is that it addresses the
constitutional level of privacy that students are entitled to when
they enter school property, which is an increasingly volatile issue
given the recent episodes of school violence. It demonstrates that a
lower expectation of privacy exists for school students on school
property, when compared with privacy in one's home or other
private area. This case attempts to establish a clear test to
determine whether a student's privacy has been violated, a test
which previously had been missing in the Pennsylvania courts.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW

APPLICATION

CONSTITUTIONAL

OF

-

CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS

INTERPRETATION
ON

THE

-

GENERAL

The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that principles in the state constitution relating to the
General Assembly's legislative authority to appropriate funds from
the state treasury
apply equally to municipalities
when
appropriating funds from local treasuries.
ASSEMBLY To LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES

-

Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1999).
53. Id. at 369-73 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 370 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
(establishing reasonableness, rather than probable cause, as the standard for determining the
validity of searches conducted by school officials in a school setting)).
55. Id. at 372 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
56. In re FB., 726 A.2d at 372-73 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 376 (Zappala, J., dissenting).
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This case involved the issue of whether Article Three, Section
Twenty-Six of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which bars the
Pennsylvania General Assembly from passing a bill giving extra
compensation to a public employee already under contract,
similarly bars a municipality from giving raises to municipal
employees who were already receiving compensation pursuant to
an employment contract.1
In 1991, the Borough of Leetsdale ("Borough") entered into an
employment contract with its police officers to be effective until
1994, one which did not include a "wage reopener" provision. 9 In
1993, borough council voted to approve an addendum to the
employment contracts so as to give substantial raises to four police
officers in 1994.60 Before this raise could be implemented, however,
the newly reorganized borough council renounced the addendum
and refused to pay the increased salary, which resulted in the
police officers filing a breach of contract claim against the Borough
61
in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.
The trial court held that Article Three, Section Twenty-Six the
prohibited the raise given by borough council, since council vias a
political subdivision of the commonwealth. 62 On appeal, the
commonwealth court affirmed the decision of the trial court.6
Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the appellants argued that
Article Three, Section Twenty-Six the prohibition against extra
compensation applies only to the General Assembly, not to
municipalities such as the Borough.6r Specifically, the appellants
claimed that the plain language of the section, as well as two
58. Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 729 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1999). The pertinent part of
the Pennsylvania Constitution reads as follows: "No bill shall be passed giving any extra
compensation to any public officer, servant, [or] employee... after services shall have been
rendered or contract made . . . ." PA. CONST. art. III, § 26.

59. Denbow, 729 A-2d at 1113-14.
60. Id. at 1114. This occurred after two council members had been defeated in
elections, thus changing the composition of borough council. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas decision was written by Judge
Bernard J. McGowan. Id. at 1113. The trial court did note that if the matter had involved
only the private sector the appellants would be entitled to recover. Id. at 1114.
63. Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 699 A-2d 838 (Pa. Cormnw. Ct. 1996). The
decision affirming the trial court was written by Judge Joseph T. Doyle. Id. at 838.
64. Denbow, 729 A.2d at 1113. At the supreme court, attorney Ronald P. Koerner
represented Ronald Denbow, and attorney Richard F. Start represented the Borough of
Leetsdale. Id.
Justice Thomas G. Saylor wrote the unanimous opinion, joined by Chief Justice John P.
Flaherty, Jr., and Justices Stephen A. Zappala, Ralph J. Cappy, Ronald D. Castille, Russel M.
Nigro, and Sandra Schultz Newman. Id.
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previous supreme court decisions, supported their claim. 65

The court first noted that Article Three, Section Twenty-Six of
the Pennsylvania Constitution is addressed to the General
Assembly; however the court continued by stating that the issue to
be answered is whether Section Twenty-Six has or should be
interpreted to apply to actions of local municipalities, as well as to
the General Assembly. 66 To aid it in making this determination, the
court looked to the two cases cited by the appellants.67 In the first
case 68 the supreme court opined that Section Eleven (now
Twenty-Six) of the Constitution should be read in connection with
Section Thirteen (now Twenty-Seven), both of Article Three; in the
second case cited,69 the court opined that Section Thirteen applied
only to an act of the legislature, not to an action of a municipality
or other local entity.70 The appellant argued that reading these two
cases together resulted in Section Twenty-Six not applying to
71
actions of a municipality.
In response to this argument, the Borough cited two other state
cases that supported their position that Article Three, Section
Twenty-Six most certainly applies to actions taken by
municipalities. 72 The Borough asserted that the prohibition placed
65. Denbow, 729 A.2d 1114 (citing McKinley v. School Dist. of Luzerne Township, 118
A.2d 137 (Pa. 1955); Retirement Bd. of Allegheny County v. McGovern, 174 A. 400 (Pa.
1934)).
66. Id. at 1115. The court notes that Article III of the constitution is entitled
"Legislation," and specifies what procedures the General Assembly should use to enact
legislation. Id.
67. Id.
68. McGovern, 174 A. 400. This case involved the issue of whether the Retirement Act
contained within Public Law 1278 violated Section 11 (now Section 26) and Section 13 (now
Section 27) of Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which the court ultimately held
did not. Id. at 404.
69. McKinley, 118 A.2d 137. In this case the appellant argued that a decree entered by
a trial court, which reduced the school board set rate of commission that a school district
tax collector received, violated Section 13 (now Section 27) of Article II of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Id. at 139. The court rejected this argument, holding that Section 13 "applies
only to a law, which means an act of the legislature, and not to action by any municipal or
local authority." Id.
70. Denbow, 728 A.2d at 1115. See McGovern, 174 A 400, 404; McKinley, 118 A.2d 137,
139.
71. Denbow, 729 A.2d at 1115. The appellant rationalized that the limitation placed on
Article III, Section 13 (now 27) in the McKinley case must apply to Article LII,'!Section 11
(now 26) as well, due to the holding in McGovern that the two sections must be read
together. Id.
72. Id. at 1116 (citing Harbold v. City of Reading, 49 A.2d 817 (Pa. 1946); Francis v.
Neville Township, 92 A.2d 892 (Pa. 1952)). Harbold involved issuance of "improvement
bonds," issued to finance street improvements in Reading, Pennsylvania. Harbold, 49 A.2d
818. A bondholder who was not going to receive payments sued the City, who supposedly
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on the General Assembly by Article Three, Section Twenty-Six
equally constrains a municipality.7 3
The supreme court ultimately agreed with the logic and case law
presented by the Borough, stating that the Borough's position
closely complied with the role that municipalities play in the
governmental system. 74 As such, the court held that the restrictions
placed upon the General Assembly by Article Three, Section
Twenty-Six of the Pennsylvania Constitution also applied to
municipalities, thus forbidding the Borough from allocating extra
compensation to police officers already covered by an employment
75
contract.
This case, which presented a single issue of first impression,
clarified whether a section of the Pennsylvania Constitution applied
to entities other than those explicitly mentioned in the language of
the constitution. This case demonstrates that the standards
embodied in the state constitution regarding the scope of the
General Assembly's legislative ability to appropriate funds from the
state coffers applies equally to municipalities, with regard to
appropriation of funds from local treasuries.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
Pennsylvania's Physical Therapy Practice Act, which prohibits
chiropractors who are not licensed physical therapists from
advertising that they perform physical therapy services, does not
unconstitutionally infringe on their freedom of expression.
Commonwealth v. State Board of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340
(Pa. 1999).
This case questioned the constitutionality of a provision in the
Physical Therapy Practice Act ("PT Act") that prevents
chiropractors from advertising that they perform "physical
SPEECH

-

had no liability, under Public Law 660; on appeal the City argued that the Public Law
violated section 11 (now 26) of Article III of the Constitution. Id. at 819. The supreme court
held that the law did violate section 11, thus the General Assembly could not require a city
to pay the bondholders. Id. at 823-24. The second case cited, Francis, appeared to be
factually similar to the present case. After concluding that the ordinance in question violated
both Articles III and IV of the state constitution, the court added that, "unbridled financial
chaos would result if municipal bodies were permitted to monetarily reward specific
individuals, no matter how praiseworthy their services." Francis, 92 A-2d at 893-94.
73. Denbow, 729 A.2d at 1118.
74. Id. at 1118-19. The court noted that "[iut is fundamental that municipal corporations
are creatures of the State and that the authority of the Legislature over their powers is
supreme." Id. (quoting Shirk v. Lancaster City, 169 A. 557, 560 (Pa. 1933)).
75. Id.
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therapy." 6 After charges were brought against a group of
chiropractors who placed newspaper advertisements that offered
"physical therapy," a hearing examiner held that the PT Act allowed
chiropractors who are certified in "adjunctive procedures" to
advertise that their services include physical therapy.77 The
commonwealth court vacated the decision and held that the PT Act
prohibited the advertisements at issue, 8 and the supreme court
allowed an appeal to decide only the issue as to whether the
commonwealth court's interpretation of the PT Act created an
unconstitutional result.7 9
The appellants alleged that the commonwealth court's
interpretation of the PT Act infringed on their freedom of
expression guaranteed by Article One, Section Seven of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.80 The supreme court began its analysis
by looking at the "adjunctive procedures" performed by
chiropractors, which the hearing examiner believed related closely
enough to physical therapy to allow the advertisement.8 1 The
appellants claimed that because the adjunctive procedures they
employ in their chiropractic practice are very similar to those
performed by physical therapists, they should be permitted to use
76. Commonwealth v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d 340 (Pa. 1999).
77. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d at 341.
78. Commonwealth v. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 701 A.2d 292 (Pa- Commw. Ct.
1997). In writing the majority opinion for the commonwealth court, Senior Judge Silvestri
looked at the plain language of the statute that stated, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
to . . . hold himself out as being able to practice physical therapy . . . in any manner

whatsoever unless such person has met the educational requirements and is licensed in
accordance with the provisions of this act." Id. at 293 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §
1304(a) (West 1996)).
79. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d at 341. At the supreme court, the following
attorneys and law firms represented the parties litigating the case: James J. Kutz and Bridget
E. Montgomery, from Eckert, Seamans, Cherin and Mellot, L.L.C., and Charles I. Artz
represented Thomas A. Boch, D.C.; Paul A. Tufano from the Office of General Counsel,
Robert J. DeSousa from the Department of State, and Assistant Counsel Bernadette Paul
represented the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs; Richard B. Tucker, III, J.
Kent Culley, John E. Graf, from Tucker Arensberg, P.C., represented Pennsylvania Physical
Therapy Association, et al. Id.
Chief Justice John P. Flaherty, Jr., wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Stephen
A. Zappala, Russell M. Nigro, and Sandra Schultz Newman. Id. Justice Ronald D. Castille
dissented, joined by Justice Ralph J. Cappy. Id. at 34445 (Castille, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 342. The appellants did not claim any infringement of their federally
guaranteed constitutional rights under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Id.
81. Id. Adjunctive procedures are defined under the PT Act as "[pihysical measures
such as mechanical stimulation, heat, cold, light, air, water, electricity, sound, massage and
mobilization." Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 625.102 (West 1996)).
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advertising that offers and describes such therapy.8 2 The court
rejected this argument, citing that while some of the procedures
performed by each group might overlap, the differences between
the two groups regarding licensing and the services, that are
provided are too vast to permit such advertising.a Because the
services that chiropractors perform do not constitute the practice
of "physical therapy," the court held that it is not an
unconstitutional violation of their freedom of expression to restrict
the advertising of their services as including "physical therapy."4
After reaching this conclusion, the court then examined the level
of protection afforded to commercial speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and applied it to the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which observes the same minimum
standards of protection.8 5 Commercial speech, which includes
advertisements, commands less protection and is more stringently
regulated than non-commercial speech; for example, courts and
government can ban untruthful or *materially misleading
advertisements without any constitutional violation.86 Allowing
chiropractors to advertise their services as including "physical
therapy" would be materially misleading to the public; therefore,
the court held that the legislative ban on such advertising served to
protect the public from deceptive commercial speech, and was
87
constitutionally sound.
A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Ronald D. Castille,
who stated that the rationale of protecting the public from
misleading information, cited by the majority as the underlying
purpose of the PT Act, was misplaced for two reasons.88" First,
82. Id.
83. Id. The court noted that physical therapists are allowed to employ their methods
and services in a much less restrictive fashion than chiropractors, who can use adjunctive
procedures only under certain defined circumstances. Id. at 342-43.
84. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d at 343.
85. Id. (citing Insurance Adjustment Bureau v. Insurance Comm'r, 542 A.2d 1317, 1319
(Pa. 1988); Pennsylvania State Police v. Hospitality Investments of Philadelphia, Inc., 689
A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. 1997)).
86. Id. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996); Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
87. State Bd. of Physical Therapy, 728 A.2d at 344. The court noted that this holding
did not restrict the chiropractors' right to advertise generally, as long as they do not hold
themselves out to provide "physical therapy." Id.
88. Id. at 344 (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Castille also stated that the majority
failed to grant the appropriate level of protection due to commercial speech under both the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting). Justice Ralph J.
Cappy joined his dissent. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
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because chiropractors do perform services that are often the same
as those performed by physical therapists; and second, because the
appellants in this case clearly stated in their advertisements that
they were chiropractors, not physical therapists.89 Therefore, since
the appellants were certified to perform the actions they
advertised, and they clearly stated in the advertisements that they
were chiropractors rather than physical therapists, no governmental
interest existed to support the statute's ban on such advertising. 90
This case had the result of clarifying the scope and applicability
of a Pennsylvania statute, and demonstrated the analysis applied by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in identifying whether a statutorily
applied limitation constituted a deprivation of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of freedom of expression.

89. Id. (Castille, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 345 (Castille, J., dissenting). To support thh, analysis, Justice Castille quoted
from a United States Supreme Court case:
when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining
process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First
Amendment generally demands . . . complete speech bans . . . are particularly
dangerous because they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain
information.
Id. (Castille, J., dissenting) (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501).
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Commonwealth Court held that the requirement that an inmate
submit a blood sample for DNA identification as a condition for
parole did not violate the separation of powers doctrine, was not
an unconstitutional ex post facto law, and did not constitute an
unconstitutional search and seizure.
Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
An inmate at a state correctional facility used the original
jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge
the retroactive parole requirement to give a blood sample to be
used for a DNA identification bank pursuant to the DNA Detection
of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act ("Act"). 91 The Act allows for a
DNA identification system to be created and used as a tool in
criminal investigations and as deterrence to recurring crime.9 2 The
inmate, Ertle Dial, challenged the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that the Act retroactively added another condition onto
parole requirements, in violation of the separation of power
doctrine, thus invalidating his guilty plea 9 3 He also contended that
the Act violated the ex post facto prohibitions contained in the
both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. 94 The
respondents in this case filed preliminary objections in the nature
95
of demurrers to the claims alleged by Dial.
The court began its opinion by considering Dial's first claim that
the Act deprived his eligibility for parole, thus affecting the length
of his incarceration, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
91. Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). Judge Bonnie Brigance
Leadbetter wrote the majority opinion, which President Judge James Gardner Colins and
Judges Joseph T. Doyle, Bernard L. McGinley, Doris A. Smith, and Dante R. Pellegrini joined.
Id. Judge Rochelle S. Friedman filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 7-12 (Friedman, J.,
dissenting).
92. Dial, 733 A.2d at 3. The identification system contains DNA from blood obtained
from felons convicted of sex offenses, murder, harassment and stalking, and indecent
assault. Id.
93. Id. at 3. Dial's petition for review was in actuality an amended petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Id.
94. Id. Additionally, Dial wanted his DNA information removed from the information
system, as well as an injunction prohibiting further DNA testing as a condition of his release
on parole. Id.
95. Id. The respondents in this case were the superintendent of the correction facility
where Dial was located, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and the State Police. Id.
Attorney Joel M. Ressler, Senior Deputy AG, represented the respondents. Id. at 2. No
appearance was entered for the petitioner. Id:
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powers. 96 Case law has established that a legislative act or order97
cannot later displace a final sentence delivered by the judiciary.
However, the court opined that the Act's requirement that Dial give
a blood sample does not alter his maximum sentence, handed
down by the judiciary, nor does it alter his parole eligibility date,
which is often premised on full compliance with a number of
prison rules and regulations. 98 Therefore, because the Act did not
alter the judgment of sentence handed down by the judiciary, no
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers existed.9
The court next considered whether the Act, specifically section
306(b), is in essence an ex post facto enhancement of Dial's
sentence, in violation of both the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. 10 0 The general rule concerning ex post facto
prohibitions requires two factors to be present; 1) the law at issue
must be retrospective, and 2) the law must alter the definition of
criminal conduct or increase the penalty of such conduct.01' 1
Additionally, there is no ex post facto violation if the legislation at
issue is not penal in nature. 0 2 The court looked at this latter
requirement first, and determined that the section of the Act
requiring blood testing was not penal in nature and therefore could
not be an ex post facto violation. 1°3 To support this determination,
the court noted that there was no evidence, either in the Act itself
or in its creation, that it was intended to punish or to act as

punishment; rather it was created
administrative capacity.' ° 4

to operate

solely in an

96. Id. Section 306(b) of the Act provides that: A person who has been convicted...
for a felony sex offense or other specified offense before the effective date of this section
and who is still serving a term of confinement ... shall not be released in any manner prior
to the expiration of his maximum term of confinement unless and until a DNA sample has
been withdrawn. Id. (quoting PA STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7651.306(b) (West Supp. 1999)).
97. Dial, 733 A.2d at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 784-85 (Pa.
1977)).
98. Id. at 4. The court looked at the opinion in Sutley, where the court stated, "[Tihe
legal sentence is the maximum sentence . . . the minimum sentence determines parole
eligibility, the maximum sets forth the period of time that the state intends to exercise its
control over the offender for his errant behavior." Id. at 3-4 (citing Suley, 378 A.2d at 786).
99. Id. The court sustained the respondents' preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer. Id.
100. Id. The specific violations would be Article I, Section 10 of the United States
Constitution, and Article I, Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id.
101. Id. (citing California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995)).
102. Dial, 733 A-2d at 4 (citing Van Doren v. Mazurkiewicz, 695 A-2d 967 (Pa. Comnmw.
Ct. 1997); Commonwealth v. IKine, 695 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)).
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id. The blood-testing requirement was likened to other identification requirements,

824
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Next, in considering the general rule and its two requirements,
the court again decided that no ex post facto violations existed. 10 5
In a similar case from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Jones v. Murray,10 6 the court held that retaining an
inmate for noncompliance of a blood taking requirement was not a
violation if the mandatory parole date had not yet been reached,
because the retention did not exceed the terms of the prisoners'
10 7
original sentence.
Finally, Dial's assertion that the Act violated the unreasonable
search and seizure prohibition contained in the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution was addressed, and rejected by
the court. 0 8 Taking a blood sample for testing does fall under the
auspices of the Fourth Amendment, and normally requires a
threshold of reasonableness.' °9 However, since Dial Was an
incarcerated felon at the time of the request for blood, one may
establish the requirement of reasonableness without the need for
probable cause or reasonable suspicion." 0 The court opined that
the public's interest in maintaining the DNA information system
outweighed any minimal intrusion occasioned by the blood
withdrawal; thus, there was no violation under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.' 1 ' The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania sustained the respondents'
preliminary objections in nature of demurrers and dismissed Dial's
petition." 2
A dissent was written by Judge Rochelle S. Friedman, who
opined that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine, the
ex post facto clauses of both the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions, as well as the Fourth Amendment of the United
such as fingerprinting and photographing. Id.
105. Id. The court found that.the Act imposed an administrative punishment where an
inmate refused to comply with a "reasonable administrative regulation." Id.
106. 962 F2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
107. Dial, 733 A.2d at 6. In Jones, the court held that there was an ex post facto
violation, however, in that situation the statute prohibited the release of non-complying
inmates who had reached their mandatory parole date. Jones, 962 E2d at 310. The
Pennsylvania Act at issue does not limit release beyond the mandatory release date
established under the terms of the original sentence established by the judiciary. Dial, 733
A.2d at 6.
108. Dial, 733 A.2d at 6.
109. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).
110. Id. at 7 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Constitution.11 3
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doctrine, Judge Friedman believed that the Act allowed legislators
to impose a different sentence, one without parole, on prisoners
who refused to submit to the blood testing, thus violating
separation of powers. 114 Employing the two requirements needed
for an ex post facto violation, Judge Friedman found that the Act
retroactively increased the punishment of certain prisoners, through
the denial of parole as well as the use of "reasonable force," which
the statute permits to be used to obtain the blood." 5 Finally, Judge
Friedman opined that the DNA samples were much more intrusive
than the majority believed, in that they reveal many things about a
person including race, appearance, and predisposition to disease,
of the
and that this level of intrusiveness constituted a violation
11 6
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This case is important because it is one of first impression. The
increasing advances in science and DNA technology guarantees that
issues such as those addressed in this opinion will continue to
arise. The increasing availability and accuracy of DNA testing will
allow it to be utilized much more in the future, insuring that
additional constitutional concerns regarding its use will also occur
in the years to come.
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The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a

township and a school district possess the same procedural due

process rights that individual taxpayers have to appeal an untimely
decision by a tax assessment board.
113. Dial, 733 A.2d at 7 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 8 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 10 (Friedman, J., dissenting). The portion of the statute employed by Judge
Friedman states the following, "Duly authorized law enforcement and corrections personnel
may employ reasonable force in cases where an individual refuses to submit to DNA testing
authorized under this act ..... " Id. at 9 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (quoting P& STAT. ANN.
tit 35, § 7651.307(c) (West. Supp. 1999)).
116. Id. at 11 (Friedman, J., dissenting). Judge Friedman went through each factor that
determines whether a search is reasonable, and found that the Act violated each of them. Id.
(Friedman, J., dissenting). The first factor, scope of intrusion, was found to be considerable,
due to the nature of DNA testing. Id. (Friedman, J., dissenting). The second factor, the
manner of testing, was found to be violative due to the allowance of reasonable force to be
applied to prisoners. Id. (Friedman, J., dissenting). The third factor, justification for testing,
was also questioned by Judge Friedman because she claimed that it made "an irrational
distinction between prisoners," did nothing to deter recidivism, might not be admissible in a
Pennsylvania court, and are not 100% accurate. Id. at 12 (Friedman, J., dissenting). Finally,
Judge Friedman questioned the fourth factor, place for testing, claiming that no evidence
showed that the correction facility took the samples in a medically approved manner. Id. at
13 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
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Richland School District v. County of Cambria Board of
Assessment Appeals, 724 A.2d 988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
This case arose as a result of a tax assessment made in 1997 on
a shopping and commercial center known as the Galleria. 1 7
Johnstown Zamias Limited Partnership ("Owner"), the owner of the
property, and the Richland School District ("School District") filed
timely appeals with the County Board of Assessment ("Board")
regarding the assessment; the owner seeking to lower the tax, and
the school district seeking to increase the amount of tax.118 The
Board held a hearing for the Owner in November of 1996, and
found that the assessment would remain unchanged. 1 9 The Board
did not hear the School District's appeal until May of 1997, and
subsequently issued an order on June 2, 1997 increasing the
20
Galleria's assessed value.
The School District appealed to the Cambria County Court of
Common Pleas, alleging that the Board had undervalued the
property.'2 ' The Owners countered, seeking to have the appeal
dismissed on the grounds that the Board's actions were void
because it missed the deadline established by statute for an
assessment appeal, and therefore the Board lacked jurisdiction. 22
The trial court granted the Owner's motion for judgment on the
pleadings, and the school district appealed to the commonwealth
court.

123

The School District's primary argument on appeal was that the
trial court had erred when it determined that a distinction existed
between the due process rights afforded to a property owner and
those rights afforded to a taxing authority, when a governmental
agency such as an assessment board fails to act in a timely
117. Richland School Dist. v. County of Cambria Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 724 A.2d
988 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). Judge Joseph T. Doyle wrote the unanimous opinion, joined by
Senior Judge Jiuliante and Judge James J. Flaherty joining in the opinion. Id.
118. Richland, 724 A.2d at 988. The Board did not consolidate the two separate
appeals. Id.
119. Id. The Board made this determination although the Owner had withdrawn its
appeal. Id.
120. Id. The Galleria's value was originally assessed at $2,944,260.00, and increased by
the Board to $3,401,730.00. Id.
121. Id. at 989. Court of Common Pleas Judge Creany wrote the majority opinion for
the trial court. Id. at 988.
122. Id.
123. Richland, 724 A.2d at 989. At the commonwealth court, attorney Richard T.
Williams, Sr. from Johnstown represented Richland Township and School District, and
attorney Alfred K Hettinger from Allentown represented Johnstown Zamias Ltd. Partnership.
Id. at 988.
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manner.124 The court' first noted that the relevant statute itself
provided that all appellants are entitled to the same rights and
procedures regarding the appeal of a tax assessment, whether they
are an individual property owner or a governmental taxing
authority.125 The court added that a municipality has been entitled
to the protections of procedural due process for a considerable
time.1 26 Based on these two facts, the court held that the trial court
had erred when it held that the School District did not have the
same procedural due process rights as an individual property
owner when a tax assessment appeals board failed to take action
before the statute required. 2 '
This case is significant because it clarified the procedural rights
owed to a governmental entity regarding a tax assessment appeal,
as compared to the rights owed to an individual.

124. Id. at 989. The school district argued that the statutory requirement at issue, that
local boards of assessment located in Fourth to Eighth Class Counties must issue rulings on
all tax appeals by October 31, was not a mandatory requirement. Id. The statute in question
states the following, "The board shall meet for the hearing of appeals . . . until all appeals
have been heard and acted upon. All appeals... shall be acted upon not later than the last
day of October." Id. (quoting PA_STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.702 (West 1994)).
125. Id. (citing PA STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.706 (West 1994)).
126. Id. at 990. See Institution Dist. v.. Township of Middletown, 299 A-2d 599 (Pa.
1973).
127. Richland, 724 A.2d.at 990. The commonwealth court reversed the court of
common pleas ruling, and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the substantive
issues in the appeal. Id.

